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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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The Peróns after the Election

by Robert J. Alexander

Juan Domingo Perón obtained the constitutional right on November 11 to remain president of Argentina for six more years. Whether he will be able to do so is another matter. In spite of an apparent continuing popularity and strong support among some of the most important sectors in the community, he faces grave dangers.

The relations of the Perón team with two groups in Argentina are likely to hold the key to its continuance in power. The first is the Army; the second comprises organized labor and the working class in general. In the last analysis the Argentine Army can keep the Peróns in power or throw them out as it sees fit. Perón remains a military man, and the military originally put him in power. On the other hand, the chief threat to his continuance in office has also come from elements of the Army.

In his relations with the military, Perón's wife is a drawback. The officer class as a whole, and the higher-ranking officers in particular, do not like Evita. She has meddled in their affairs as she has meddled in virtually every phase of Argentine public life. Moreover, many if not most of the Army

officers have little respect for her. They resent having a woman take such an outstanding part in public affairs, and they particularly resent her interest in military matters.

It seems more than likely that the comparative retirement of Evita since her decision late in August not to be a candidate for the vice-presidency of the republic is due mainly to the influence of the Army. There are rumors and counterrumors about her "illness." Some say that it is a species of nervous breakdown; some, that it is a physical ailment; while many feel that it has merely served as an excuse for her to withdraw gracefully from public affairs for a more or less extended period of time. Whatever the explanation for her illness, it is certain that the Army put its foot down in August and forced her to withdraw her vice-presidential candidacy.

The working class has been the other strong arm of the Perón regime. There are indications that during the last two years or more Perón has been losing the working-class support which he had built up in the earlier years of his political career. It is probable that he has lost a good deal of the backing

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of the workers of Buenos Aires and the other big cities which he had gained in the middle 1940's. The November election, however, shows that he still holds the support of a considerable proportion of the workers in general and particularly of the rural workers and those of the smaller towns and villages. It is probable, too, that many if not most of the new immigrants coming into Argentina—considerable numbers from Italy and Spain—are inclined to be Peronistas.

Repression of Opponents

The November election was not a completely accurate test of the popular support which the regime enjoys. Although the balloting may well have been honest and ballot-box stuffing was probably kept at a minimum, the atmosphere surrounding the elections was one of terror rather than of constitutional electoral process. The abortive military revolt in October was used by the Perón administration as an excuse to round up a number of the opposition political leaders. Many of the opposition candidates had to do much of their campaigning from a jail cell, since they were incarcerated at the height of electoral activity.

So severe was this terror that two of the opposition presidential candidates—Alfredo Palacios, the Socialist nominee, and Luciano Molinas, the candidate of the small Progressive Democratic party—withdrawed before the election, claiming that an honest and fair poll was impossible because of the behavior of the government.

On the other hand, the new elec-

toral system and the multiplicity of opposition candidates undoubtedly worked in Perón's favor. The new electoral law substituted the single constituency system for congressional posts in place of the modified proportional representation system which had previously prevailed. It also forbade all coalition candidacies. Hence, there were half a dozen different nominees contending with each other for Perón's job.

Anti-U.S. Policy

One cannot expect any basic change in Perón's domestic or foreign policies. He is faced at home with the serious problem created by inflation and by the rapidly decreasing value of the Argentine peso. He is likely to continue his foreign policy of "Argentina *über alles*" and to play Russia off against the United States while still trying to gain and keep the leadership of the Latin American bloc. He will undoubtedly blow hot and cold toward

the United States, depending on which procedure he thinks will get him most concessions from us. In any case, he will continue to be the chief opponent of the United States in the Americas and will at the same time undoubtedly try to get Washington to bail him out of an increasingly critical economic situation.

The United States will be unwise to be taken in any more by the protestations of the Perón team. We should have learned our lesson during his first term and be wary during his second. The only thing which is really likely to lead to Perón's overthrow is a serious economic crisis. It is not to the interest of the United States or the cause of democracy in the Western Hemisphere for us to prevent the development of such a crisis.

(Robert J. Alexander, assistant professor of economics at Rutgers University, has spent considerable time in Argentina and is the author of *The Perón Era*, published by Columbia University Press in 1951.)



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON LATIN AMERICA

Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread, by Frank Tannenbaum. New York, Knopf, 1950. \$3.50.

Written by a Columbia University professor long familiar with the Mexican scene, this book is a penetrating study of modern Mexico in terms of its sociology and psychology as well as its economics and politics. The final chapter discusses the great significance to general U.S. foreign policy of the way in which Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt conducted Mexican-American relations.

The Yenan Way, by Eudocio Ravines. New York, Scribner, 1951. \$3.

An exposé of the Communist design to capture Latin America allegedly formulated in Moscow in 1934, this "I Was a Red" story deals not only with the politics of the author's own country, Peru, and with the organization of the Popular Front in Chile, but also casts much light on the "Road of Yenan" as expounded by Mao Tse-tung, whom Ravines met in Moscow. The Chinese leader then stressed the necessity for capturing the *petite bourgeoisie* through the exploitation of their desire for wealth and power.

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Armaments: How Much When?

The rearmament policy of the United States is sound if two of its assumptions are correct. The first assumption is that, by arming, this country and its Atlantic allies can achieve a position of strength that will induce the Soviet Union to adopt a policy of trustful cooperation with the West. The second is that this achievement is possible because the West can increase its armaments at a faster rate than the U.S.S.R.

The second assumption is based on the belief that while at this moment Russia's military strength exceeds that of the West, the U.S.S.R. cannot greatly augment its military resources because it is already devoting to armaments all it can spare of the raw materials and industrial capacity at its disposal. The United States, by contrast, can greatly increase its armed strength in the future because at present it is devoting not more than 20 per cent of its industrial production to the output of war material, as compared with 45 per cent in World War II.

While it is difficult both to give an accurate assessment of Russia's industrial resources and to compare them with those of the United States, figures on two key items essential to armament production are of interest. It is estimated that the United States, which controls 54 per cent of the world's total oil output (the United States and Britain together control about 90 per cent), produces nearly 6 million barrels of oil a day, as compared with 1 million in the U.S.S.R., which obtains 10 per cent of the world's oil output. The United States is capable of producing 100 million tons of steel a year, and under pressure even more, as com-

pared with between 25 and 30 million tons in the U.S.S.R.

In keeping with the second assumption, American rearmament policy has a double character. It is designed to influence the Kremlin not only by strength that exists, which would still fall short of Russia's existing strength if the schedules of present planning are fulfilled, but also by strength in reserve, which, officials in charge of American military matters hope, is sufficient to provide the West with greater military power, under full mobilization, than the power Russia could gather in a crisis.

What Is "Adequate"?

The hypothetical basis of American rearmament policy beclouds the present controversy in Washington about the adequacy of the pace at which the United States is increasing its strength. The controversy began when the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services published a report on November 28 stating that the arms program is lagging and intimating that the Soviet Union is going ahead more speedily than the United States. Charles E. Wilson, President Truman's economic mobilizer, replied that the rate of progress was satisfactory. On December 5 Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett sustained Mr. Wilson by inference when, at a press conference on his return from Europe, he said that the military budget could be reduced next year from its present \$60 billion and that, with less money, the United States could greatly increase the size of its combat air force.

The answers to questions as to whether the pace of arming is adequate depend on the meaning of the word "adequacy."

It is inadequate if one assumes that preparedness means the ability to fight a major war tomorrow. It is inadequate if one expects it to have its intended political and diplomatic effect on the Soviet Union now. It is probably adequate if one judges the program on the basis of whether the United States is getting the best possible results for the money it is spending. The Preparedness Subcommittee reported that deliveries of military goods by the arsenals were lagging by 40 to 35 per cent (70 per cent in the case of guided missiles) behind schedule. The lag undoubtedly exists, but such a lag is customary in military production, to judge from past experience.

In time the lag can be overcome. The production of military goods by a given plant increases almost in geometrical proportion during the first three years of operation. "The . . . plant which produces about 5,000 aircraft in the first 12 months should produce about 18,000 by the second 12 months' period, and something over 40,000 by the third 12 months' period," Mr. Lovett (at that time Deputy Secretary of Defense) told the House Appropriations Committee last May.

The real issue is not whether the United States is lagging behind its own schedule but whether Washington should enlarge its armament program in order to take on the burdens which our European allies cannot or will not assume.

BLAIR BOLLES



What Kind of Unity for Europe?

United States Congressmen who visited Europe this autumn have returned with a marked feeling of disappointment over what they regard as a regrettable lag both in the achievement of European unity and in the pace of European rearmament. Similar disappointment has been voiced in the American press. Particularly disturbing to public opinion here has been the discovery that the Conservative government of Winston Churchill is no less determined than the Labor government of Clement R. Attlee to avoid binding commitments by Britain to the trinity of institutions proposed for Western Europe and vigorously supported by the United States: the Schuman plan for the pooling of coal and steel; the European army; and a supranational European authority which would coordinate the political, economic and military activities of a Western European union.

Britain True to Tradition

This disappointment could have been avoided had the American public been adequately informed in the past about the manifold problems of European unification—problems which cannot be validly compared, as they often are, with those faced by the 13 American colonies when they decided to form “a more perfect union.” The role traditionally played by Britain—and no Englishman is more deeply aware of this than Winston Churchill, superb historian of his own people—has been that of a great island nation which sought to maintain a balance of power between contending countries on the continent but without assuming any detailed obligations to them which

might in any way impinge on the relationships the British regard as paramount: relationships with their empire overseas, with the dominions and, since World War II, with the United States.

Mr. Attlee followed this traditional policy, not only because he feared that closer association with the uncontrolled economies of the continent might jeopardize Britain's economy, but because this policy appears to most Britons consonant with what they regard as their national interests. Mr. Churchill, when he enjoyed the freedom of criticism which is a privilege of the Opposition, needled the Labor prime minister about his attitude on European unity and thus raised false hope among the members of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. Now that he is back in office, he has proved even more outspoken than his predecessor in insisting on the primacy of Britain's ties with the Commonwealth and the Empire.

Without the participation of Britain, as France and the Low Countries have long recognized, a Western European union might become dominated by a revived Germany, especially if the Germans achieve unification and thus again become the most populous and powerful nation on the continent outside of the U.S.S.R. It is the fear of the overwhelming force which a unified and rearmed Germany could wield in Europe which caused the French to urge the Schuman plan and the European army, in the hope that the Germans, by being integrated into the broader framework of Western Europe, might be held in check by the balance-wheel of Britain and,

even better, of the United States. Many Europeans who agree with Americans on the need of unity contend that what Western Europe needs most urgently is to enter a larger union which would include the two North Atlantic partners on this side of the ocean—the United States and Canada.

Western Europe and U. S.

Meanwhile, American observers believe that the Western European nations, with the single exception of Britain, could put forth a greater rearmament effort than they have done so far. This is reported to be the conclusion of the committee of “three wise men”—W. Averell Harriman of the United States, Sir Edwin Plowden of Britain and Jean Monnet of France—which was appointed at the Ottawa conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reconcile the economic and military needs of the Western European nations. The committee's report will be discussed at the meeting of the NATO Council in Lisbon on February 2.

The “three wise men” are said to believe that the Western European nations, particularly France, Belgium and Denmark, could increase armament production without additional strain on their economies by pooling their resources, eliminating waste and duplication and agreeing on a greater degree of specialization. The key production problem at present is the lag in coal output, which has created the paradoxical situation where some of the coal-producing nations of Europe spend their limited dollar resources on imports of

(Continued on page 8)



Indonesia:

Tests of Independence

by Shannon McCune

Dr. McCune, professor of geography, Colgate University, on a leave of absence served as deputy director, Far East Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration. From March to mid-August 1951 he was acting chief of ECA's special technical and economic mission to Indonesia. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of ECA.

Wherever one looks in Indonesia today the impression of a seething revolution in action is inescapable. There is a trend toward democracy in the former Dutch colony as there was in early America. The Indonesian revolution has borrowed much from the United States. A poignant sight in Djakarta is a defaced Dutch monument on which is scrawled in black paint: "Dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." These words kindle a hope that a sense of dedication to ideals of universal application may be maintained in Indonesia and that democracy may develop and grow strong as it has in the United States.

Economic Strains

Indonesian independence must be solidified and not diverted or destroyed by the very speed of revolution. At present severe pressures prevail which threaten to wipe out the freedom newly won. Before the days of independence, *Merdeka* (freedom) was a simple slogan that bound together in common cause the vast bulk of the Indonesians. Once freedom was achieved, divisive tendencies set in. And the Indonesians have been slow to realize the fact that freedom also requires the shouldering of responsibilities.

Six months ago, Dr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former minister of finance, said: "If nothing is done to change the situation, Indonesia will end up in a very serious financial-economic crisis by the end of 1951." This crisis has not yet materialized. However, while food production is

increasing, the government's revenues and expenditures are approaching balance and law and order have improved, the economic strains are severe. Most of the 75 million people live on a relatively primitive, stable economic basis. They are growing rice and other foods on a rich, although in places overcrowded, land. Income measured in cash terms is very low, roughly estimated at \$30 per year per capita. These Indonesian farmers are not threatened with famine. Not all of their real needs are met, however, and their desire for things beyond their present ability to buy is increasing.

It is in the sectors of the Indonesian economy which develop and exploit the nonsubsistence resources that the serious dangers lie. The clogging of the harbors, beset by strikes and stealing; the lack of replacements of vital communications and transportation equipment; the insecurity of the plantations, raided and looted by armed gangs; the recurrent labor disputes; and many other factors have resulted in a drop in production for some key industries. Other industries have never had a postwar rehabilitation. Because of insecurity there has been no large inflow of capital devoted to stable enterprises, profitable for the future. If such deteriorating conditions continue, the basic economy will be seriously diseased by this virus of chaos.

The economic potential of Indonesia may be seen by flights over the islands, visits to the farms, plantations and factories, and study of

modern mining enterprises. Indonesians at work in government offices, in the fields and in workshops impress a visitor with the country's human potential. With adequate training and education, by building on a religious and social base which has dynamic possibilities, the Indonesian people can move forward to a more thorough realization of the economic potential which is latent in their land's soil and resources.

Lack of Realism

Unfortunately, Indonesians seem to have little realistic grasp of their possible role in the free world today. Freedom still shimmers before their eyes, blinding them to the possibilities and complexities ahead. Scapegoats are constantly sought to account for economic and financial difficulties. When world prices for rubber and tin sag, it is not recalled that only months before they had soared to dizzy, uneconomic heights. Above all, although some of their leaders understand the situation, the Indonesian people as a whole do not fully realize that the world is threatened by forces of tyranny and aggression, that some small nations have already been overrun, that the juggernaut is moving in Southeast Asia and that only by strong and rapid action in concert with other free nations may they save their new-won freedom. Already the forces of aggression are laying their foundation in Indonesia according to the familiar patterns: capturing the labor unions, concentrating on the key economic installations of trans-

portation and communications; infiltrating unscrupulous, although able, officials in high places; furnishing at low cost slick-paper magazines and books to divert the minds of the educated; keeping up a constant barrage of lies so that numerous little truths may be hidden; using by threat or subversion minority groups (in Indonesia's case the 2 million Chinese) to foment trouble and shield spies; weakening the economy by fostering slowdowns, strikes, smuggling, and so on. Indonesia in its weakened condition, just emerging from a long period of colonial rule, a severe Japanese occupation and a hectic struggle for independence, may fall easy prey to these various pressures.

The proposal, favored by some, for the creation of a "strong man" government will not prove successful in this situation. Neither will there be a return to a Dutch-dominated colonial regime, despite the unrealistic thinking and writing of those who point out the relative order and supposed benefits of the past. Such solutions would only stifle the very forces which created independence and can give strength to Indonesia.

Many Indonesian leaders do recognize the internal economic and financial chaos and the threat of aggression. They have taken some decisive action, for example the wholesale arrests in mid-August 1951, to curb subversion and economic disruption. President Soekarno and others are preaching the doctrine of productivity. This year rice production reached prewar levels. But since the population has increased by approximately 15 per cent, a new two-year program has had to be launched to make Indonesia self-sufficient in food. Increased productivity has been achieved in rubber and tin, dollar-earning raw materials of high strate-

gic value. However, to achieve a diversified, balanced economy, which is the goal of Indonesia's leaders, improvement must be made in transportation and communication facilities, road building and harbor improvement, electric-power production and so on. As a part of the "Sumitro Plan," outlined by the former minister of trade and industry, emphasis is being given to the development of a cooperative movement in agriculture, small-scale industry, and commerce. In part the cooperative movement is an attempt to weaken the tight hold of the Chinese and Dutch merchants. The Indonesian people are poor in a land of plenty. If they do not obtain economic improvements through the methods of democracy, they may be enticed by the false promises of other doctrines.

What U. S. Can Do

If the existing situation in Indonesia is clearly recognized, a vigorous American foreign policy, particularly if implemented through programs of economic and technical assistance, can prove effective. The ECA program now in operation in Indonesia has five interrelated facets. Modest amounts of grant-aid, totaling \$8 million in 1950-51 and projected at the same scale for 1951-52, are used for dollar costs of projects in agriculture, public health and small industries reaching down to the villages. This aid is coupled with technical assistance which provides for experts who work with Indonesians at all levels, from engineering planning by an American engineering company to fertilizer distribution, from farmer cooperative organizing to DDT spraying. Assistance is also given to Indonesians going abroad for technical training and observation. Counterpart deposits in Indonesian rupiah are available from

ECA programs carried on before Indonesia became independent, as well as from current ECA programs. These provide local currency for technical assistance and grant-aid projects as well as capital for an industrial bank, for road building, for public housing and other developmental purposes.

Dollar costs of longer-range projects may be financed from a loan fund of \$100 million which was established by the Export-Import Bank two years ago. This project requires on-the-spot planning and supervision which the ECA-financed technical assistance personnel can furnish on request of the Indonesian government. Finally, no matter whether dollars are derived from grant-aid, loans, or sales of materials to the United States, the Indonesians, in order to purchase goods in short supply on the American market, require priorities. ECA acts as a claimant agency for Indonesia, arranging such priorities.

This five-prong operation of technical and economic assistance has been dynamic, yet full of improvisations. Personalities and situations have changed rapidly, and the forces of aggression have pressed down threateningly. The Indonesian leaders, very few in number, are busy with the urgencies of the day. Many have inadequate training to deal with complex economic affairs. The vestiges of the past colonial days still cling. Noncooperation is practiced by some, including a few of the Dutch, who long for the "good old days" which they think, mistakenly, will return if chaos is rampant. Some people hope that in a period of unrest they may make large individual profits; others lay the groundwork for an economic fifth column.

The Indonesian government has no over-all economic plan with a neat sector calling for ECA aid. This

can be illustrated by noting that the Indonesian budget for 1950 has not yet passed the Legislative Assembly. The acceptance of American aid, even though desperately needed, is not easy for some Indonesians. This is due to many factors—nationalistic fervor, fear of foreign entanglements, lack of recognition of Indonesia's weaknesses, bureaucratic inefficiencies, sabotage by Communist-inclined officials and others, and so on. The United States cannot make the blunder of appearing to push aid upon reluctant Indonesians. Food forced down a throat will result in disgorgement, not nourishment.

The United Nations is giving technical assistance and carrying on health programs through a number of its various agencies. Already progress has been made, in part through the Indonesian Coordinating Committee for Foreign Aid, in correlating the ECA and the UN programs. Such action may diminish Indonesian suspicions about American intentions.


The United States, through its aid program, is helping the Indonesian government mobilize its economic resources so that there will be an increase in the productivity of food and other consumer goods in short supply and also of strategic materials required by the rest of the free world. These activities should lead to the formation of much-needed domestic capital which, coupled with outside capital, will be beneficial for longer-range economic development.

American government action, however, is not nearly enough in this particular situation. Private American business and cultural activities should be much more extensive in Indonesia today. With some exceptions, notably the oil industry, these activities are still very little developed. They are not tuned to the potentialities of the situation.

Vigorous American cultural and informational programs, more effective when conducted under private auspices, can bring about awareness of problems and possibilities on both sides of the Pacific. The American labor movement should support Indonesian labor with soundly conceived technical assistance and informational programs. American business concerns might logically and effectively form joint partnerships with Indonesians. In these days of uncertainties this is easier said than done, but the possibilities should be thoroughly explored. There are un-

There is basic economic strength and notable economic potential. The threat of overt aggression is not so immediate as in the mainland portions of Asia, although the covert attacks are perhaps more serious. Aggressive communism will be defeated only by strengthening democracy politically and economically. The inadequacies of an American program of mutual security solely devoted to military aid are shown most eloquently in Indonesia. The building of situations of strength in Indonesia—and in most of Asia—can be accomplished most effectively

Indonesia's Resources



deniable frustrations in carrying on business with people who are not advanced in business practices and who have the natural hesitancy of the inexperienced. There is severe competition from Dutch and Chinese business concerns. The role of Japan in the economic life of Indonesia may become more important in the future. However, it will be to the self-interest of American business concerns and decidedly to the interest of American policy in Asia if private interests enter vigorously into trade, commerce and development in Indonesia.

Indonesia has the greatest promise for growth of the countries of Southeast Asia. There is considerable freedom and the start of democracy.

by economic and political means rather than by blind reliance on military power.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Our Way Out," *The Economic Review of Indonesia* (Jakarta), Special Edition, March 19, 1951; Paul M. Kattenburg, "Indonesia," in Lawrence K. Rosinger and associates, *The State of Asia* (New York, Knopf, 1951); Raymond Kennedy and Paul M. Kattenburg, "Indonesia in Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXIV, No. 15 (Dec. 15, 1948); George McT. Kahin, "Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," Secretariat Paper, Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York, IPR, 1950); S. Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, trans. by Charles Wolf, Jr. (New York, John Day, 1949); H. J. Van Mook, *The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (New York, Norton, 1950); Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story* (New York, John Day, 1948). Contemporary events are noted in *The Indonesian Review* (Jakarta), and in *Report on Indonesia*, Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia (New York), mimeographed biweekly.

As Others See Us

The United States government, as well as American business leaders, has long been urging the Western European nations to unite and thereby achieve integration of their military and economic resources. While there is considerable sentiment among Europeans for some sort of unity, a good deal of skepticism is expressed as to the feasibility and efficacy of the policy advocated by Washington.

For example in the Netherlands the right-wing Catholic newspaper *De Maasbode* of Rotterdam says: "In the American press complaints have been expressed that Western Europe has not achieved unity sooner. They don't understand the national sentiments of nations which have a centuries-old existence of independence behind them. Some modesty in this matter would suit the United States. Its powerful country consists of states which have their own legislation in many fields. Though there is a strong central authority, these states cannot achieve agreement on such an important issue as the regulation of the water drainage of a large river such as the Missouri, as a result of which large

areas were recently flooded. . . . Such a situation is absolutely inconceivable to us Netherlanders."

The *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, Liberal organ of Rotterdam, sees the danger that a purely continental European bloc would be dominated by Germany and might be dragged by German irredentist aspirations into a war against Russia. It much prefers a European union forming part of an Atlantic community where "America's influence might work as a brake on a Germany trying to usurp hegemony."

The French writer Bertrand de

Jouvenel, writing in the Swiss newspaper *Gazette de Lausanne*, contends that instead of wasting time on "daydreams" of an agreement with Russia (he believes that while war can be rendered highly improbable by virtue of the military strength arrayed on both sides, an agreement is impossible), "we would do better to devote sustained attention to the international problems of the Western world. . . . Such intimacy of interests cannot but give rise to friction and misunderstanding. Here is quite a large enough field of activity for the spirit of international collaboration."

Spotlight

(Continued from page 4)

coal from the United States. American experts contend that the problem could be solved if, among other things, Britain would permit thousands of Italian coal miners to work in its pits. The European nations, however, argue that the transfer of workers is not as simple as Americans believe and raises many thorny economic and social questions.

It is natural that the American public should want to see a swift unification of Western Europe as a counterbalance to the U.S.S.R. on the continent. In discussing the problems of European unification,

however, it might be useful for us to ask ourselves how much of the medicine of restricted sovereignty, lowering of tariff and immigration bars and acceptance of supranational authority which we prescribe for the salvation of our allies would be accepted today by the majority of the American people. We must also realize that since 1945 the Western European countries have developed a great deal of functional cooperation—in agriculture, industry, road transport and so on. This kind of cooperation may over the long run prove more valuable than grandiose schemes for immediate political and economic integration.

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